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REGULATING FOOD ADVERTISEMENTS: SOME FIRST
AMENDMENT ISSUES
John MA. DiPippa*
I. INTRODUCTION
Eric Schlosser's Fast Food Nation indicts the fast food industry for
creating products that have devastated the economy, the environment, and
our health.' Among other things, he calls for significant reform in the mar-
keting of fast food:
Today the health risks faced by the nation's children far outweighs the
needs of its mass marketers. Congress should immediately ban all adver-
tisements aimed at children that promote foods high in fat and sugar.
Thirty years ago Congress banned cigarette ads from radio and televi-
sion as a public health measure - and those ads were directed at adults.
Smoking has declined ever since. A ban on advertising unhealthy foods
to children would discourage eating habits that are not only hard to
break, but potentially life-threatening. Moreover, such a ban would en-
courage the fast food chains to alter the recipes for their children's
meals. Greatly reducing the fat content of Happy Meals, for example,
could have an immediate effect on the diet of the nation's kids. Every
month more than 90 percent of the children in the United States eat at
McDonald's. 2
Schlosser expressly links advertising and obesity, analogizes tobacco
and junk food, and urges action to protect the nation's children. 3 This essay
will take up his call and highlight the First Amendment obstacles to the
kinds of food-advertisement regulations Schlosser calls for. In the end, the
First Amendment's Commercial Speech doctrine, as it is currently applied
by the United States Supreme Court, may make any regulation of food ad-
vertising difficult, if not impossible.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Commercial advertising is protected by the First Amendment, but this
is a comparatively new development. The United States Supreme Court
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initially declared that commercial advertising was not a category of speech
protected by the First Amendment.4 The Court treated it as self-evident that
the First Amendment imposed no limits "on government as respects purely
commercial advertising." 5 This put advertising in the company of obscenity,
libel, and incitement to violence: that is, categories of speech that the First
Amendment simply did not recognize as such.6
Over the years, however, the Court blurred the line between protected
and unprotected speech.7 Finally, in 1975, the Supreme Court declared that
commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection.8 The Court
relied on advertising's value to individual consumers and to society in gen-
eral.9 The First Amendment, the Court ruled, does not simply protect the
advertiser.' 0 If the advertiser has a right to speak, then individual consumers
have a right to receive information from the speaker.' In fact, the con-
sumer's interest in "the free flow of commercial information ... may be as
4. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
5. Id. at 54.
6. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitu-
tional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well ob-
served that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communica-
tion of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punish-
ment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.
Id. (citation omitted).
7. Compare New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (explaining that
an advertisement in newspaper was not commercial speech even though newspaper charged
for the space because the advertisement "communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses."), with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822
(1975) (stating that pre-Roe v. Wade advertisement for out-of-state abortions was not com-
mercial speech because it "did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It con-
tained factual material of clear 'public interest'), and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission of Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding prohibition on gender-
specific employment advertisements because they were "proposal[s] of possible employ-
ment" and not statements on matters of public policy).
8. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
9. See id.
10. Id. at 756.
11. Id. The First Amendment protects the source of the "communication" and the re-
cipients. Id. "If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertis-
ing." Id. at 757. This statement is important when we consider regulating advertisements for
lawful but potentially harmful products-like tobacco or junk food. Id.
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keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate."
' 12
In addition, society has a general interest in commercial advertising
because advertising helps consumers decide how to allocate their resources
in a free-market economy. No matter how "tasteless and excessive" adver-
tising may seem, it is still information "as to who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price."'13 Our free-market system
depends on consumers making "intelligent and well-informed" purchasing
decisions. 14 Advertising is "indispensable" not only to the purchasing deci-
sions of individual consumers but also to "the formation of intelligent opin-
ions as to how that system ought to be regulated."' 5 Thus, even if the First
Amendment is limited to speech that contributes to democratic self-
government, commercial speech helps advance that goal too. '
6
At the same time, the Court recognized that commercial speech dif-
fered from other protected categories. Commercial speech has "greater ob-
jectivity and hardiness" than other forms of protected speech.' 7 Untruthful
speech, by itself, does not receive protection and advertisers' factual claims
could be verified without chilling their speech.1 8 This stands in contrast to
other areas of First Amendment law, where falsehood is protected and the
remedy is opposing speech. 19 The Court also decided that the prior restraint
doctrine did not apply to commercial speech.20 Speakers-that is, advertis-
ers-had an economic incentive to continue speaking, unlike non-
commercial speakers who might be deterred by a prior restraint or an over-
broad law.2'
12. Id. at 763.
13. Id. at 765.
14. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 765.
15. Id. The commercial speech doctrine has been criticized as a revival of economic
substantive due process. Thomas H. Jackson & Jon C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979). Justice Black-
mun's point here mitigates that claim. Blackmun implicitly argues that our economic system
is going to be subject to regulation by the democratically elected branches of government.
That regulation will be largely immune from judicial review under the post-New Deal re-
gime. Thus, voters (i.e, consumers) must be fully informed about the economic system they
control through the ballot.
16. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 765.
17. Id. at 771-72, fn. 24.
18. Id. at 771.
19. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation of public
figure actionable only if statement made with actual malice."); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
20. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772.
21. Id. "Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likeli-
hood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely." Id. at 722, n.24. The
Court later used this same reasoning to conclude that the overbreadth doctrine did not apply
to commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977) ("[s]ince advertising
2006]
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The opinion seemed to contain an inherent contradiction: should com-
mercial advertising be afforded full First Amendment protection, or-as a
less important category of speech-should it receive less protection? On the
one hand, the Court offered a ringing endorsement of the value of commer-
cial advertising.22 On the other hand, the opinion listed the ways in which
commercial advertising differed from other protected speech and, accord-
ingly, waived the protection of several facets of the First Amendment.23
This conflict suggested that commercial speech regulations would be sub-
ject to a less severe standard than other forms of speech.
The Court eventually adopted a middle ground test for commercial
speech regulations in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service
Commission.24 Recognizing the common-sense distinctions of commercial
speech, the Court held that commercial speech was entitled to less protec-
tion than other forms of protected speech.25 Regulation of commercial
speech must satisfy a four-part test: the advertising must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading, the regulation must be supported by a sub-
stantial government interest, the regulation must directly advance the gov-
ernment interest, and the regulation must be no more extensive than neces-
sary.26
The court later clarified the "no more restrictive than necessary" prong.
In Board of Trustees v. Fox,27 Justice Scalia reasoned that the "subordinate"
position of commercial speech argued against reading Central Hudson as
imposing a least restrictive alternative test.28 He wrote:
What our decisions require is a "'fit' between the legislature's ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends"--a fit that is not necessar-
ily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is "in proportion to the interest served;"
that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but... [a] means
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. 29
is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly suscep-
tible to being crushed by overbroad regulation."). Compare Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 521 (1972) (holding that an overbreadth challenger need not show that his or her speech
was protected because "persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well
refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions."), and Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (193 1) (preferring subsequent punishment to prior restraint).
22. See supra, notes 10-20.
23. See supra, note 25.
24. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
25. Id. at 563.
26. Id. at 566.
27. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
28. Id. at 479.
29. Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 28
REGULATING FOOD ADVERTISEMENTS
The Central Hudson test and its subsequent refinement moved away
from the seemingly strict First Amendment protection offered by Virginia
Board.30 This suggested that the states would have considerable room to
craft commercial speech regulations. Results in commercial speech cases
have swung like a pendulum, with the Court veering from a strict to a loose
application of the Central Hudson test.31 Like the Lemon32 test for Estab-
lishment Clause cases, the Central Hudson test seems to leave enough room
to justify any result that an individual judge may want to reach.33 Lately, the
Court seems to have adopted a strict version of the test. In 44 Liquormart
Inc. v. Rhode Island,34 four justices would have abandoned Central Hudson
in favor of strict scrutiny while five justices applied the Central Hudson test
to the regulation in that case.35 Nevertheless, five justices applied the Cen-
tral Hudson test to the regulation at issue in Thompson v. Western States.
36
30. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
31. The Court struck down the advertising regulation in the following cases: Thompson
v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (striking down a federal law that
exempted compounded drugs from FDA approval requirements only if provider did not
advertise them); Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S.
173 (1999) (striking down a federal regulation that prohibited broadcasters from advertising
privately operated casino gambling even where such gambling was legal); 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (declaring unconstitutional a state law prohibited
price advertising of alcoholic beverages); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995)
(voiding a federal regulation that prohibited beer labels from listing alcohol content). The
Court upheld the advertising regulation in the following cases: Florida Bar v. Went For It
Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding a state bar rule prohibited any lawyer from written
solicitation of client within 30 days of an accident); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tour-
ism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding a statute that legalized casino gam-
bling but prohibited advertising).
32. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
33. In his concurring opinion in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993), Justice Scalia likened the Lemon test to
[a] ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried .... It is there to scare
us [when] we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at
will. When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we
wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely .... [Such] a docile
and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one
never knows when one might need him.
Id. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Mary Meaden, Joe Camel and the Targeting
of Minors in Tobacco Advertising: Before and After 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 31 NEW
ENGLAND L. REV. 1011, n.381 (1997) (relating Justice Thomas's discomfort with Central
Hudson and Lemon); Frederick Schauer, Opinions As Rules, 62 U. Cmt. L. REv. 1455 (1995)
(comparing the deceptive clarity of Lemon and Central Hudson).
34. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
35. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg would have abandoned Central
Hudson while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer
stayed with Central Hudson. Justice Scalia's endorsement was less than ringing, however. Id.
2006]
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A majority of the Court seems to apply a strict version of the test
whenever the state tries to prohibit the dissemination of truthful commercial
advertising because of the bad decisions consumers may make.37 Thus, the
doctrinal pendulum seems to be swinging toward the strict end of the Cen-
tral Hudson test, if not preparing to overrule it. At the same time, a majority
of the justices appear skeptical whenever they see paternalism behind the
state's regulation. These two developments do not bode well for the success
of anti-obesity advertising regulations.
III. THE LORILLARD CASE
One Supreme Court commercial speech decision has special impor-
tance for anti-obesity-advertising regulation because it comes closest to the
situation involving the obesity epidemic. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly,38 the Court considered a range of anti-tobacco advertising regula-
tions.39 This case, more than any other commercial speech case, demon-
strates the pitfalls that await anti-obesity-advertising regulations.
Lorillard invalidated restrictions on billboards and in-store displays,
but upheld rules requiring tobacco products to be placed behind the sales
counter. The parties agreed that smoking was legal, the advertisements were
accurate, and the public's health (especially its children's) was an important
interest. 40 The case turned on whether or not the regulation directly ad-
vanced this interest and, if so, whether it was too restrictive of an adult's
right to receive information.41
at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
36. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002). Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Kennedy, and Souter joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinion. Id.
37. Id. at 374 (explaining that "[w]e have previously rejected the notion that the Gov-
ernment has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in
order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with the information.").
Id.
38. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
39. Id. The Massachusetts Attorney General promulgated extensive regulations of the
sale, advertising, and labeling of cigarettes pursuant to his power to combat unfair and decep-
tive trade practices. Id. at 533. The provisions included a ban on the use of self-service dis-
plays of cigarettes, cigars, or smokeless tobacco products; a requirement that all such prod-
ucts be out of the consumer's reach and accessible only to store personnel; a ban on outdoor
advertising of suchxc products within 100 feet of a public playground, playground area of a
public park, or an elementary or secondary school; and a ban on point-of-sale advertising
lower than five feet from the floor in stores located in the above areas. Id. Other provisions
regulated the sale and promotion of cigars by banning cigar sampling or give-aways. Id. at
534-36. The Court held that the regulations governing the cigarette point-of-sale and outdoor
advertising were preempted by federal law. Id. at 551. The Court considered the First
Amendment challenges to the rest of the regulations. Id.
40. ld. at 555.
41. Id. at 555-56.
418 [Vol. 28
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In this case, the regulations had prohibited the placement of any bill-
boards that advertised tobacco products within 1000 feet of a school.42 The
Court noted that although this regulation directly advanced the govern-
ment's interest in preventing underage smoking, the regulations were more
restrictive than necessary. 43 The Court noted that the law, as a practical mat-
ter, amounted to an almost absolute ban on tobacco billboards.44 In addition,
the regulations also banned oral communications; those regulations led to
seemingly absurd results.45
The biggest problem was that the regulations restricted the right of
adults to receive tobacco advertising. Even though the state's interest in
preventing underage smoking is "substantial, and even compelling," adult
tobacco use is still legal.46 In such situations, adults have a right to receive
the communication and the government cannot unduly infringe on that
right.
47
The restriction on the height of indoor sales displays met a similar fate.
Here the court said that the law simply failed to advance the government's
interest. To be constitutional, a law must provide more than remote or indi-
rect support for the government's interest.48 The size of the in-store display
would do little, if anything, to thwart underage smoking. Even if it were true
that the height of the display correlated with the height of the child buying
the product, many children were taller than the limit imposed on the signs.49
In addition, the law was more restrictive than necessary. A blanket ban on
42. Id. at 534-35.
43. Id. The state's conclusion that advertising stimulated young people to smoke was
based on more than "mere speculation and conjecture" but "[w]hatever the strength of the
[state's] evidence ... we conclude that the regulations do not satisfy the fourth step of the
Central Hudson analysis." Id. at 561.
44. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562. The challengers maintained that the regulations would
prevent advertising in 87 to 91% of the available area. Id.
45. "Apparently, that restriction means that a retailer is unable to answer inquiries about
its tobacco products if that communication occurs outdoors." Id. at 563.
46. Id. at 564.
47. Id. at 564-66. To support this claim, the court cited cases where it struck down
regulations designed to protect children from indecent speech. See Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60
(1983); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). This is significant because each of these
cases dealt with speech that was considered fully protected by the First Amendment. It was
not surprising that the court would not want to "reduce the adult population ... to reading
only what is fit for children." Butler, 352 U.S. at 383. But Central Hudson and Fox exempted
commercial speech from full First Amendment protection. Thus, the citation of the indecency
cases suggests that even justices who support the Central Hudson test view commercial
speech as closer to full First Amendment protection than not.
48. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566.
49. Id. The Court noted that "[n]ot all children are less than 5 feet tall, and those who
are certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings." Id.
2006]
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displays over five feet tall was not a reasonable fit with the government's
interest in blocking underage smoking. °
The Lorillard court upheld the requirement that tobacco products must
be located out of consumers' reach and sold from behind the sales counter.5 '
The Court said that this did not significantly impede speech; rather, it regu-
lated conduct that had a communicative impact. 2 Thus, the court used its
symbolic speech standard. 53 This standard requires that the regulation ad-
vance a substantial government interest that does not target speech and that
alternative means remain available to disseminate the speaker's message.
5 4
Interestingly, this standard is similar to the Central Hudson test. Neverthe-
less, the court upheld the regulations of sales practices.
55
Moving tobacco products behind the counter advanced the govern-
ment's interest in curbing underage smoking without interfering with the
rights of adults either to hear the cigarette company's message or to pur-
chase the product.
5 6
Justice Thomas's opinion is important for two reasons. First, he makes
a strong case for rejecting the Central Hudson test and increasing protec-
tions for commercial speech.57 Second, he is the only justice to link the
regulations at issue in Lorillard with anti-obesity regulations.
Justice Thomas rejects the notion of a variable First Amendment.5 8 If
speech is protected, then it is entitled to full first amendment protection-
especially the speech at issue when the government seeks to limit informa-
tion based on a paternalistic sense of what is good for its citizens.5 9 Accord-
50. Id. at 567.
51. Id.at 570.
52. Id. at 569.
53. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding rule prohibiting de-
struction of draft card as applied to purposeful burning of draft card as political protest). The
Court has applied this doctrine to other communicative actions. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,
529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding public indecency statute proscribing nude dancing); Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (enforcing public indecency statute requiring nude
dancers to wear pasties and a g-string); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (upholding
prohibition on flag burning).
54. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
55. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 571.
56. Id. at 569-70.
57. This point takes on added significance. Since this paper was orally presented, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has died and Justice O'Connor has announced her retirement. Their re-
placements can shift the court decisively toward the mild version of Central Hudson that the
late Chief Justice advocated, the intermediate version advanced by Justice O'Connor, or the
repudiation of Central Hudson put forward by Justice Thomas.
58. Lorillard, 553 U.S. at 579. "[T]here is no philosophical or historical basis for assert-
ing that commercial speech is of lower value than noncommercial speech." Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
59. "[A]n asserted government interest in keeping people ignorant by suppression ex-
pression is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of commercial speech than
[Vol. 28
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ingly, Justice Thomas would use a very strong version of strict scrutiny.60 In
Justice Thomas's view, most attempts to control truthful advertising would
be unconstitutional.
His comments about childhood obesity are especially intriguing here:
Tobacco use is, we are told, "the single leading cause of preventable
death in the United States." The second largest contributor to mortality
rates in the United States is obesity. It is associated with increased inci-
dence of diabetes, hypertension, and coronary artery disease and it
represents a public health problem that is rapidly growing worse. Al-
though the growth of obesity over the last few decades has had many
causes, a significant factor has been the increased availability of large
quantities of high-calorie, high-fat foods. Such foods, of course, have
been aggressively marketed and promoted by fast food companies. 61
This statement makes the case that the government has a strong interest
in stemming the tide of obesity. The problem is-excuse the pun-large and
getting larger. It is exacerbated by the "availability of large quantities" of
bad food "aggressively marketed and promoted by fast food companies. 62
Thus, Justice Thomas connects the obesity epidemic with the marketing
tactics of fast food companies.
He goes on to show that, unlike tobacco companies, fast food compa-
nies overtly target children and that their marketing campaigns have
worked:
Respondents say that tobacco companies are covertly targeting children
in their advertising. Fast food companies do so openly. Moreover, there
is considerable evidence that they have been successful in changing chil-
dren's eating behavior. The effect of advertising on children's eating
habits is significant for two reasons. First, childhood obesity is a serious
health problem in its own right. Second, eating preferences formed in
childhood tend to persist in adulthood. So even though fast food is not
addictive in the same way tobacco is, children's exposure to fast food
advertising can have deleterious consequences that are difficult to re-
63
verse.
As Lucy did to Charlie Brown, Justice Thomas pulls the football away
just as we are about to kick it. He concludes that, despite the overt similari-
it can justify regulation of noncommercial speech." Id. (quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
60. Id. at 575-77 (even if commercial speech does not receive full First Amendment
protection, there is no reason to dispense with strict scrutiny when a state tries to regulate it
for reasons "unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process.").
61. Id. at 587 (internal citation omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
2006]
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ties between the two industries and the lifelong harm their marketing cam-
paigns do to children:
Respondents have identified no principle of law or logic that would pre-
clude the imposition of restrictions on fast food and alcohol advertising
similar to those they seek to impose on tobacco advertising. In effect,
they seek a "vice" exception to the First Amendment. No such exception
exists. If it did, it would have almost no limit, for "any product that
poses some threat to public health or public morals might reasonably be
characterized by a state legislature as relating to 'vice activity."' That is
why "a 'vice' label that is unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibi-
tion against the commercial behavior at issue fails to provide a princi-
pled justification for the regulation of commercial speech about that ac-
tivity."64
In other words, Justice Thomas would strike down most of the anti-
smoking regulations in Lorillard because the logic behind them would also
justify regulation of fast food advertisements.65
Thomas's opinion contains an extended analysis of the state's argu-
ment in Lorillard using a strict scrutiny standard. He rejects the state's
claim that protecting children from the harms of smoking is compelling
66
and, even if it is, argues that the advertising restrictions are not narrowly
tailored to advance that goal.67
The Lorillard decision should be the touchstone for any future anti-
obesity regulations, but Justice Thomas's opinion may be the future of
commercial speech. His opinion spells out the similarities between anti-
smoking and anti-obesity regulations, but concludes that they do not justify
advertising regulations. At the very least, he speaks for at least four justices
of the Supreme Court. Any anti-obesity advertising regulations must take
his position into account. Regulators should pattern their approach to avoid
the problems identified in Lorillard. Even so, it seems that few advertising
restrictions, even those aimed at protecting children, will survive a constitu-
tional challenge.
64. Lorillard, 553 U.S. at 589 (internal citations omitted).
65. Upholding the tobacco regulations would "accept a line of reasoning that would
permit restrictions on advertising for a host of other products." Id. at 587.
66. Id. at 580. ("[ijt is difficult to see any stopping point to a rule that would allow a
State to prohibit all speech in favor of an activity in which it is illegal for minors to en-
gage."). Id.
67. Id. at 584-85. The state failed to consider ways to advance its goal without restrict-
ing speech. Id. at 586.
[Vol. 28
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IV. POTENTIAL REGULATIONS AND THEIR LIKELY FATE
There are two ways to regulate food advertisements to combat obesity.
First, the government can prohibit or regulate advertisements aimed at vul-
nerable populations. Second, the government might impose disclosure re-
quirements on food advertisers or food merchants.
Complete advertising bans will be almost impossible to uphold. Loril-
lard makes this point; other commercial speech cases echo it. The Court
seems to use a strict version of the Central Hudson test when reviewing
regulations that totally ban a form of advertising or a category of informa-
tion. This test recurs when the law expressly bans the advertising or if, as in
Lorillard, it does so as a practical matter.
Targeted regulations, however, are another matter. Lorillard acknowl-
edged that protecting children's health is an important, perhaps compelling,
government interest. The billboard regulation failed in Lorillard because it
went too far in limiting adult access to advertising information. Presumably,
restrictions on advertising in forums geared to children might survive court
scrutiny. For example, limiting fast food ads during children's shows or
banning food commercials in schools are more narrowly tailored ways to
curb youth obesity.
Generic regulation of misleading claims is possible. 68 Many food com-
panies make arguably misleading claims when they market their products in
ways that are particularly attractive to children. Even if they disclaim any
health claims, these messages are particularly difficult for children to deci-
pher.69 Perhaps a law that more tightly defined what constituted misleading
statements in ads aimed at children would satisfy the Central Hudson test.
70
It also seems possible to ban certain unhealthy foods from sale in
schools. This would be narrowly tailored to advance the government's in-
terest and it would not restrict adults' rights in any respect. In fact, Lorillard
pointed out that this kind of regulation does not implicate speech rights at
all.7 1
Lorillard upheld the regulation that required tobacco products to be
sold from behind the counter. This might also be appropriate for food prod-
ucts that present a particular risk to children. The problem is that the be-
hind-the-counter rule supported the state's prohibition on the purchase of
68. Lee J. Munger, Comment, Is Ronald McDonald the Next Joe Camel? Regulating
Fast Food Advertisements Targeting Children in Light of the American Overweight and
Obesity Epidemic, 3 CoNN. PuB. INT. L. J. 456 (2004).
69. Id. at 477 (citing American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Children,
Adolescents, and Television, 95 Pediatrics 295 (1995) (stating that children are incapable of
distinguishing false information from true information on television)).
70. Id.
71. Lorillard, 53 U.S. at 569-70.
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tobacco by minors and its goal to curb underage smoking. Buying unhealthy
food is not illegal. Thus, the question here is whether or not the law suffi-
ciently advances the state's health goals without unduly restricting the free-
dom of adults. On the other hand, First Amendment interests do not seem
infringed here at all.
Most regulation short of total prohibitions should be upheld. The court
has long supported rules that require advertisers to disclose information
about their products, even if that information might lead a consumer to
forgo the purchase.72 Restaurants can be required to accurately disclose the
nutritional content of their food, for example. Perhaps high fat or fast food
can carry health warnings, as cigarette packages do.73
There is some evidence that junk food has addictive qualities.74 If so,
this places it on a par with tobacco and increases the strength of the gov-
emnment's interest. 7 But, as Justice Thomas pointed out, there is no "vice
exception" to the First Amendment.7 6 Even if junk food were addictive, the
First Amendment continues to protect advertisers as long as eating junk
food is legal. Moreover, Lorillard makes it clear that while the government
may be able to restrict what children hear about an addictive (but legal) sub-
stance, it cannot excessively limit an adult's right to the information even if
the addictive consequences are the same as for children. Perhaps the only
72. This assumes that people can decode advertisements and that they will listen to the
disclaimer. But advertising itself may be the problem. See Tamara R. Piety, Merchants of
Discontent: An Exploration of the Psychology ofAdvertising, Addiction, and the Implications
for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE L. REv. 377, 381 (2001) (noting that advertising and
addiction are "characterized by denial, escapism, narcissism, isolation, insatiability, impa-
tience, and diminished sensitivity.").
73.
[P]eople can reasonably be expected to exercise personal responsibility only if
the manufacturers of products provide meaningful disclosure and adequate warn-
ings .... Without that, people have no idea how dangerous trans fat is. Without
a reference, a context, simply telling people something contains trans fat isn't
enough. Despite the best of intentions, warnings are not just for the best and
brightest, but for all people-forgetful, tired, fatigued .... [a]nd children, too.
It's hard to argue that a 9-year-old exercises personal responsibility.
Munger, supra note 68, at 478 (citing Judith Weinraub, The Blame Game? Is It Our Fault
We Like Bad Fats? WASH. POST., December 10, 2003, at FO1 (quoting John Banzhaf)).
74. Franklin E. Crawford, Fit for its Ordinary Purpose? Tobacco, Fast Food, and the
Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1219 (2002). Even if fast food
is not addictive, its advertising can change eating habits for a lifetime. See Lorillard, 533
U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]here is
considerable evidence that [advertisers] have been successful in changing children's eating
behavior.")
75. Professor Sylvia Law argues for an exception to the First Amendment for advertis-
ing for addictive substances. Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 909 (1992).
76. See supra, note 63.
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response is for the government to undertake a truly effective counter-
advertising campaign.
77
V. CONCLUSION
The Commercial Speech doctrine limits the effectiveness of advertis-
ing regulation in anti-obesity campaigns. The constitutional doctrines that
protect the right of adults to receive information about smoking will make it
difficult, if not impossible, to pass effective anti-obesity regulations. At
most, anti-obesity regulations may limit the access of children in limited
circumstances and require disclosures on fast food items. But these tactics
will work slowly and unevenly. To be sure, the First Amendment protects
the speech of anti-obesity advocates, but these groups do not have the re-
sources of even one fast food company-let alone the combined resources
of them all. Faced with the deluge of slick advertising, is it any wonder why
today's teenagers may be the fattest generation ever?
77. See Note, The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and Counteradver-
tising in the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (2003).
78. Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice
in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1653 (2004) ("Before we can progress in the war against
flab, we will have to dig deeper to try to understand what makes us cringe when we hear
about a four-hundred-pound man suing McDonald's. Another frame is needed. Instead of
distilling our collective corpulence down to 'a decision,' we need to examine why we so
often attribute behavior to personal choice. Instead of looking at how we eat, we need to look
at how we think.").
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